E During the 1880's and 1890's, the innovations of James Buchanan Duke first disrupted and then rationalized the American tobacco industry. Duke's career and the early history of his American Tobacco Co. serve as case studies in both the history of business administration and in the coming of "big business" to the United States.
tage of the holding company device and of the New Jersey general incorporation law of 1889. Like Standard Oil and other companies, however, the cigarette combination soon turned to increased vertical integration and organizational consolidation. And, again in line with the Standard Oil pattern, the creation of an overproductive capacity in the face of a limited market was the key force in causing consolidation.
All the companies which turned to cigarettes faced a common production problem, and all met it in the same way. The problem was that cigarettes were hand-made by skilled rollers, who were scarce in the United States. The solution which the cigarette companies found was either to import skilled immigrants or to hire away the immigrant laborers already working for New York firmnns making the expensive Turkish and Egyptian brands.9 The Kinney Tobacco Co. induced East European cigarette rollers to immigrate, and the Dukes brought 125 immigrant rollers from New York to Durham.1o Often these skilled laborers worked at several successive American firms.11 They usually supervised cigarette production and trained large numbers of young women and girls in the art of rolling cigarettes by hand. These factory girls provided a less expensive source of labor than male workers and were the industry's main line of defense against labor unions after they had replaced their instructors in the factories.12
Once domestic firms solved the labor problem, they began to expand their markets, driving sales of imports and of the expensive Turkish and Egyptian brands downward by means of lower-priced cigarettes. By the latter part of the 1870's, it was clear that the domestic, bright-leaf tobacco cigarettes were becoming the dominant type. Domestic producers were acquiring an ever-increasing superiority in American markets. 13 But the cigarette remained a kind of orphan in the family of American tobacco manufacturing. As a trade journal later pointed out: 14 For about fifteen years .. . the cigarette business did not attract much attention in the trade, nor develop as rapidly [as it did during the decade of the 1880's]. This was due not so much to . . . small profits, as to the fact that established tobacco manufacturers took up the cigarette as a side issue, but, having organized departments for making and selling them, 12 In 1878, a trade journal observed that "in the last great strike of segar makers, the cigarette makers did not participate. Three years ago men were generally employed, and a strike took place--women were substituted, and no trouble has since occurred." U.S. Tobacco Journal, November 2, 1878. The cigarette industry was an early example of the kind of semi-skilled, industrial labor force which the American Federation of Labor later found so difficult to assimilate. After the advent of machine production in the 1880's the labor skills required in the cigarette industry were further lessened, thereby further diminishing the possibility of unionization.
13 See U.S. Tobacco Journal, June 19, 1877.
14 Tobacco, January 31, 1890. found little difficulty in putting them on the market along with a line of smoking tobaccos, and under these conditions the growth and development of the cigarette in its early stages was slow.
The industry in these early years was, thus, relatively small-scale and unimportant. But with the opening of the 1880's, a new competitor appeared on the scene who was to revolutionize the entire industry in a decade -James Buchanan Duke.
II
"Buck" Duke was a shrewd and tough businessman, ambitious and fiercely competitive. He drove W. Duke, Sons & Co. to the top of the cigarette trade in less than a decade. More than any other individual he was responsible for the formation of the American Tobacco Co., and he ran that vast combination for a score of years after its founding. When the courts dissolved the company, the only man who understood the complex interrelationships of the combination well enough to dismantle it rationally was James Duke. His Horatio Alger story is genuine, and his biographers have done him more than justice.15 James Duke's father, Washington Duke, had founded the business after the close of the Civil War. The Dukes ran their business from the family farm outside Durham until 1875, when they built a factory in the town. In 1878 a five-man partnership was created. Washington Duke, James Duke, James' brother Benjamin N. Duke, Richard H. Wright (a local tobacco manufacturer), and George W. Watts (a Baltimore businessman) each contributed $14,000. The partnership ended in 1885 and the firm then incorporated under its previous name, W. Duke, Sons & Co.'6
The Duke firm did make some profits, mostly in granulated smoking tobacco, but not enough to satisfy the ambitious James Duke. He felt that as long as the company stayed in the production of smoking tobacco it had no real future. The predominance of the "Bull Durham" brand, manufactured by W. T. Blackwell & Co., also of Durham, was apparently unshakeable. Duke allegedly remarked, "my company is up against a stone wall. It can't compete with Bull Durham. Something has to be done and that quick. I am going into the cigarette business." The other partners were less certain of the wisdom of the decision, but Duke ultimately persuaded them. In 1881, the company began the production of cigarettes.'7
For the first two years after the shift into cigarettes, the older partners had good reason to regret their decision, for the move had all the earmarks of a rousing disaster. The Duke firm made little headway because the government at that time was considering a reduction of the cigarette tax from $1.75 to 50 cents per thousand.'8 The bill was not passed until March 1883, the reduction to take place the following May. The Duke brands were not established in the market and many dealers refused to buy them and take the chance of losing the difference in tax, should the tax be lowered. Duke thus found himself in a very unenviable position: his factory was forced to close, his warehouse bulged with unsold cigarettes, and his brands made little progress.19
When the government finally reduced the tax in March 1883, Duke made the first in a long chain of bold decisions. He immediately reduced the price of his cigarettes from 10 cents to 5 cents per pack of ten cigarettes. He declared that jobbers' orders would be filled at the lower price, provided that at least three-quarters of the goods were delivered after the tax reduction in May.
The Duke products became the lowest priced ones on the market, and in the two months before the tax reduction went into effect, Duke sold his backlog of cigarettes, though at a loss. His factory reopened. He firmly established his brands in the trade through a combination of low prices and advertising.20 He had caught his competitors napping.
Duke's increased advertising at the time of the tax reduction taught him a lesson he did not forget. He continued to use advertising to stimulate sales so that he could keep production costs down.21 He established offices and a factory in New York to be nearer his markets and to secure better advertising facilities.22 That same year he bought 380,000 chairs and had painted on the back of each an advertisement for his "Cameo" brand cigarettes. The chairs were placed in cigar stores throughout the nation. of his profits which seemed appalling to more conservative manufacturers." 23 Duke showed a consistent willingness to innovate and to move quickly in order to obtain the maximum benefit from innovations in the industry. An interesting example of this can be seen in his handling of packaging. One of the problems in increasing the market for cigarettes was that they were sold in loose, fragile paper packages which caused the cigarettes to break readily. Duke introduced a stiff, sliding box for cigarettes, and when another inventor produced a better version, Duke immediately ordered 50,000 of them.24
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that James Duke was the leading innovator in the American cigarette business during the 1880's. He made entrepreneurial contributions in marketing, in purchasing, and in production which were the driving forces for change. when there was a shortage of crops, for speculators and rehandlers to make handsome profits.28 Some of the manufacturers began in the 1880's to create their own purchasing departments in a half-hearted attempt to reduce these raw material costs. Only the Duke company, however, made a really successful effort to eliminate the middleman. Duke, as he later testified, appreciated the value of reducing the role of the "speculator who had been . . . buying and selling to the manufacturers, with the exception of Duke's Sons and Co. We had been buying a good part of our tobacco in the loose warehouses direct from the farmer." 29 The Dukes had their own warehousing facilities almost from the beginning of their business. The warehousing and the use of company-employed leaf buyers marked important steps toward vertical integration in purchasing, well in advance of the combination of the leading producers. The middleman was a costly liability for the manufacturers, and Duke led the way in his elimination even before the creation of the American Tobacco Co.
Here an important difference from the experience of Standard Oil is clear: vertical integration backward into an extensive purchasing network occurred before the combination in cigarettes and not in petroleum. Overproduction of petroleum came very early, and manufacturers tried associations in an attempt to rationalize the flow of crude oil to the refineries. Overproduction of leaf tobacco did not occur so rapidly, and the leaf markets did not join in unwieldy associations, as did producers of crude. Consequently, Duke could assure a steady and less costly flow of raw materials for cigarettes by integration through company buyers and warehouses.
Significant vertical integration also appeared in the means of distribution, as well as purchasing. From its earliest years, the cigarette industry sold its products by means of traveling salesmen. The drummer was the means through which the companies made potential consumers and retailers aware of their product. These drummers traveled all over the United States and abroad, attempting to stimulate demand for cigarettes. They took orders from wholesalers and retailers, wholesalers probably taking the larger share. Even company officials sometimes acted as drummers.
James Duke had been an effective salesman from the beginning of the Duke company, and continued to serve in that capacity from time to time until about 1885.30 During the sales push at the time of During the 1880's, however, significant organizational advances occurred in the distribution system. Each of the five leading producers continued to sell its products by having its traveling salesmen take orders for goods, title passing to purchaser on delivery.32 But, with the Dukes again in the forefront, manufacturers organized and maintained a system of independent distributing centers in the principal cities in order to expand the market. Connected with these sales agencies were generally a manager, a city salesman, and one or two traveling agents. This organizational innovation was another indication of vertical integration, this time forward into sales and distribution. The cigarette found no ready market; it was a relatively new product of no intrinsic value to the consumer. Producers therefore had to devise a system of sales and distribution to make consumers aware of their products and to see that wholesalers and retailers stocked them. There is a clear contrast with the petroleum industry which, in its early years, utilized established marketing channels for coal oil to meet a ready market.33
In production, as in purchasing and distribution, the major firms followed similar patterns, patterns usually set by the Duke company. Until the 1880's, they produced all cigarettes by hand labor. The factory girls were virtually human machines, but the manufacturers sought a reliable mechanical means of mass producing the cigarettes. Like many another American invention, the cigarette machine was an example of induced innovation, called forth by the needs and rewards for machine production. During the 1870's, a wave of more or less useless contraptions designed to make cigarettes appeared. Co. had its machines tried commercially in 1883.35 Allen & Ginter received the first of the Bonsack machines for their factory at Richmond. They tried the device for a short time but soon decided against using it. There was, they apparently thought, a strong public prejudice against machine-produced cigarettes, and besides the machine did not function perfectly.
James Duke leased some of the Bonsack machines later that same year. Duke ignored the reasons for which Allen & Ginter had rejected the machines. He put his mechanics to work to improve the operation of the machines and brushed aside the question of consumer prejudice.6 As he later stated: 37
We commenced to use the machines . . . largely earlier than any other manufacturer. The others could not make them go and they were also afraid that the cigarettes made on the machines the public would be prejudiced against them because they were machine-made ... I think Allen and Ginter started-Allen and Ginter had had the machine . . as early as 1883 . . . but they did not do much with them; were afraid of them, but after they saw we had made a success of them in In return for this, the contract provided that Duke should get the use of the machines at a rate of 24 cents per thousand cigarettes rather than the usual rate of 30 or 33 cents per thousand. Duke was to get his discount through rebate checks. Further, the arrangement was to be permanent unless the Dukes divulged the provisions of the contract or unless they failed to use the machines on their better brands.39 Just over six months later, an addition to the con- The Duke company began to produce most of its cigarettes by machine in 1885, encountering little of the consumer resistance its rivals had anticipated. Duke's application of the Bonsack machines revolutionized the business of making cigarettes, and the profits of the Duke company rose during subsequent years.41
The machines brought about a tremendous reduction in the cost of manufacturing. By 1884, the Bonsack machine was producing from 100,000 to 120,000 cigarettes per day, the equivalent of the production of forty to fifty hand workers. The exact amount by which production costs fell is unclear, but one scholar estimates that the cost of manufacture was reduced from 80 cents per thousand to 80 cents.42 Government estimates do not include the 1880's, but they do show the labor cost differentials from the handmade products of the 1870's to the machine-made ones of the 1890's. In 1876, labor costs were about 96 cents per thousand; by 1895, labor costs for the same cigarette were slightly over 8 cents per thousand.43 Duke, like other producers, initially overcame any popular prejudice against the machines in a very simple way: he used them in the greatest secrecy and the public remained unaware of their widespread application for years.44
The machines played a key role in bringing about a high degree of concentration and eventual combination in the cigarette industry. Duke's introduction of machine production was clearly the most significant innovation he made in the industry. A few men controlled the best machines through patents, which led to concentration of production in a few large companies.45 The machines meant that these few companies could produce at relatively equal costs tre- mendously increased numbers of what were basically similar products. Because the products usually came to the consumer in a pack of ten cigarettes for 5 cents, even an advantage like Duke's rebates from the Bonsack Co. could make no significant inroad in price to the consumer. Reduced costs even of about 10 cents per thousand in the cost of leasing machines, and slightly reduced leaf costs could not cause price competition since the price for consumers was already at such a low level. Overcapacity also became a real problem as soon as machine production was introduced, and the manufacturers fought fiercely to preserve or enlarge their share of the limited market.
As was the case in some other industries, such as patent medicines, the competition expressed itself chiefly in the form of expensive and sometimes elaborate advertising. Advertising and sales costs became almost identical. The advertising grew more bizarre as the decade progressed.46 As competition came to center around packaging and gimmickry, advertising costs rose. Profits were squeezed as the major companies spent huge sums to outdo each other. In 1889, the last year before the companies combined, the Duke company spent $800,000 on advertising. This amounted to 20 per cent of gross sales and provided one impetus toward combination.4
The advertising flood represented, of course, a desperate struggle among the leading firms for a share in a market in which supply had outrun demand. Machine production came at a time when the industry's growth rate was declining. Although the demand for cigarettes grew almost every year, the rate of increase fell off sharply in the 1880's and 1890's. In the five years from 1879 through 1884, the number of cigarettes on which internal revenue taxes were paid increased by 281 per cent. In the following five years, 1884-1889, the figure rose by only 137 percent, indicating a trend which was confirmed by the increase of only 48 per cent in the period 1889-1894.48 The market clearly was leveling off (see Figure 1) . As a result, the dominant firms were running out of maneuvering room and competed all the more fiercely. competition through packaging and gimmickry, and, perhaps most important of all, a leveling off of demand for their product. Cooperation became an ever more appealing and logical solution, and, once more, James Duke led the way. Duke tried to effect a loose combination between his company, Allen & Ginter, and the Bonsack Co. early in 1888. He sought to keep the Bonsack Co. from leasing its machines to the Kinney Co. and wanted a contract giving his firm and Allen & Ginter exclusive use of the machines. A large stockholder in Bonsack wrote Francis S. Kinney: "Whether Duke is paying enough to prevent . . . further efforts to put the machines in your factory and secure his determined effort to form this monopoly I do not undertake to say and firmly believe that unless you take some action soon you will be too late." 49 The attempt to keep the machines out of Kinney's hands failed, though some kind of agreement was signed that year between Duke, Allen & Ginter, and the Bonsack Co.50
By the summer of 1888, however, the forces of combination were gathering in earnest.51 In that year, the Bonsack Co. bought the The producers held a series of meetings at the end of the 1880's in an attempt to work out a combination, but the clash of personalities and the wounds remaining from previous fierce competition made negotiations difficult. As a participant later commented, "there were some pretty stormy times . . . they would meet and break up and wouldn't speak, and then they would get together again . . . there was a great deal of friction among these men and they were very difficult to keep talking any length of time together." 55
In addition to the personal relations involved, the negotiators faced other difficult problems. These problems lay in three main areas: the reluctance of the individual companies to give up their identities and join a combination; the recurrent doubts about the legality of forming a trust; and disagreements about how to divide the combination's stock among the companies forming it.
Each of these businessmen took pride in his own company and was hesitant to see it subsumed into a combination.56 As a result, it was necessary to work out a compromise which allowed the constituent companies to maintain the facade of individuality for a time. In that way a satisfactory division was reached.
As a result of these negotiations, the American Tobacco Co. was incorporated early in 1890. After an unsuccessful attempt to organize the company in Virginia, a charter was secured in New Jersey."6' American Tobacco was capitalized at $25,000,000 -$10,000,000 in preferred and $15,000,000 in common stock. W. Duke, Sons & Co. and the Allan & Ginter firm each received $3,000,000 in preferred and $4,500,000 in common. The Kinney Co. got $2,000,000 in preferred and $3,000,000 in common; W. S. Kimball & Co. and Goodwin & Co. each received $1,000,000 in preferred and $1,500,000 in common. The cigarette companies soon moved to secure the advantages for which they had effected the combination. The need for a more rational organizational structure, which had been felt especially by Duke, was met in the following few years. Duke installed an elaborate system of cost accounting in 1890; less profitable brands were abandoned and small, less efficient factories closed. After the interregnum between incorporation and centralization had passed, advertising and sales were coordinated from the New York office. 8s Cigars were produced in very simple machines in small lots and could not be massproduced by machine as could cigarettes.
The cigar industry was characterized by many relatively small competitors, which made the task of acquiring a majority of output very difficult.
o9 Bureau of Corporations, Report on Tobacco, I, part 1.
